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1. Introduction 
 
Neuroscience research often uses information measures, such as mutual 
information or transfer entropy, to identify the anatomical, functional and 
effective connections between different areas of the brain or a neural 
simulation (Sporns et al. 2004; Sporns 2011). Many authors have observed 
that integration is a key feature of conscious states (Baars 1988; Metzinger 
2003), and it has been a natural progression to suggest that measures of 
functional and effective connectivity could be used to identify the areas of the 
brain that are highly integrated and thus correlated with conscious states. 
Tononi (2004; 2008) has gone beyond this correlation approach to claim that 
consciousness actually is integrated information, and proposed algorithms for 
identifying the areas of maximum information integration in a system 
(Tononi and Sporns 2003; Balduzzi and Tononi 2008). 
The type of information integration that is claimed to be linked to 
consciousness has a very specific meaning because it is not just the integration 
that is important, but the differentiation of the information states as well. 
Tononi (2004; 2008) illustrates this idea of differentiated integration using the 
example of a digital camera sensor with a million photodiodes. This sensor is 
highly differentiated because it can enter 21,000,000 different states, but in each 
of these states the photodiodes are acting independently and there is no 
integration between them. In contrast, consider a million Christmas lights 
connected to a single switch: when the switch is on, the lights are on; when 
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the switch is off, the lights are off. In this system there is a high level of 
integration between the switch and the lights, but almost no differentiation 
because the system can only enter two possible states: all lights on or all lights 
off. In between the camera photodiodes and the Christmas lights are systems 
that are both differentiated and integrated: they can enter a large number of 
different states and these states are the result of causal interactions between 
the elements. According to Tononi (2004; 2008), key examples of 
differentiated and integrated systems are the areas associated with 
consciousness in the human brain. 
One of the key attractions of information integration theories of 
consciousness is that they are precise enough to be experimentally tested. For 
example, Tononi‟s most recent theory (Tononi 2008) can predict the areas of a 
system that are associated with consciousness, the amount of consciousness 
that is present and the qualitative character of this consciousness for each 
state of a system. This precision of information integration theories points the 
way towards a more scientific approach to consciousness, in which falsifiable 
predictions made by different mathematically formulated theories of 
consciousness can be systematically compared (see Section 4). A second 
advantage of information integration theories is that they can be applied to 
both artificial and natural systems: if a link could be established between 
information integration and consciousness in humans, then it would be 
possible to make convincing predictions about the consciousness of artificial 
systems as well. 
A major conceptual problem with information integration theories is that 
consciousness is a real phenomena, whereas the information states that a 
system holds appear to largely depend on a subjective interpretation - and it is 
difficult to see how something that is metaphysically real can be correlated 
with or identified with a subjective interpretation. To address this issue, the 
third section of this paper uses Floridi‟s (2009; 2010) theory of information to 
argue that Tononi‟s information integration theory of consciousness is more 
correctly interpreted as a data theory of consciousness, which has the 
advantage that Floridi‟s notion of data can be more easily linked to objective 
properties of a physical system. It is also suggested that Floridi‟s notion of 
information as meaningful data could be used to understand theories of 
consciousness that emphasize the relationship between a system and its body 
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and environment. The last section of this paper addresses a number of 
philosophical and practical problems with the experimental testing of the link 
between data and information integration and consciousness. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
Research on information integration and consciousness is closely linked to 
work on the identification of functional and effective relationships between 
neurons and neuron groups using Granger causality (Granger 1969), transfer 
entropy (Schreiber 2000) and other measures, either using scanning or 
electrode data, or large-scale models of the brain. One example of this type of 
work is Honey et al. (2007), who used transfer entropy to study the 
relationship between anatomical and functional connections on a large-scale 
model of the macaque cortex, and demonstrated that the functional and 
anatomical connectivity of their model coincided on long time scales. Another 
example is Brovelli et al. (2004), who used Granger causality to identify the 
functional relationships between recordings made from different sites in two 
monkeys as they pressed a hand lever during the wait discrimination task. 
Sporns et al. (2004) and Sporns (2011) give an overview of this type of 
research. 
A number of people have suggested that there is a link between 
information integration and consciousness (Baars 1988; Metzinger 2003), or 
that information integration actually is consciousness (Tononi 2004; Tononi 
2008), and several algorithms for calculating information integration have 
been put forward. These include neural complexity (Tononi et al. 1994), 
stateless Φ (Tononi and Sporns 2003), state-based Φ (Balduzzi and Tononi 
2008),1 causal density (Seth 2008), liveliness (Gamez and Aleksander 2011), 
and an information integration measure that can be applied to time series 
data (Barrett and Seth 2011). Seth et al. (2006) gives a review of earlier work, 
identifies a number of weaknesses in Tononi and Sporns‟ (2003) method, and 
criticizes the link between information integration and consciousness.  
                                                 
3 The information integration measure put forward by Tononi and Sporns (2003) is referred 
to as “stateless Φ” to distinguish it from the related state-based measure of Φ of Balduzzi 
and Tononi (2008). 
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There has been a limited amount of experimental work on the link 
between information integration and consciousness. For example, Lee et al. 
(2009) made multi-channel EEG recordings from eight sites in conscious and 
unconscious subjects and constructed a covariance matrix of the recordings 
on each frequency band that was used to identify the complexes within the 8 
node network using Tononi and Sporns‟ (2003) algorithm. This experiment 
found that the information integration capacity of the network in the gamma 
band was significantly higher when subjects were conscious. Massimini et al. 
(2009; 2010) carried out experiments in which a TMS pulse was applied to the 
subject‟s brain and the resulting activity was recorded using EEG. Massimini 
et al. found that the activity resulting from the TMS pulse was more localized 
and less differentiated when the subjects were unconscious, suggesting that a 
combination of integration and differentiation is linked to conscious states. In 
the simulation work on information integration detailed predictions have 
been made about the amount and distribution of consciousness in an 18,000 
neuron network (Gamez 2010), and some preliminary comparisons have been 
carried out between state-based Φ and liveliness (Gamez and Aleksander 
2011). 
 
 
3. The Nature of Information 
 
“Information is notorious for coming in many forms and having many 
meanings. It can be associated with several explanations, depending on the 
perspective adopted and the requirements and desiderata one has in mind.” 
Floridi (2010), p.1 
In the work using information theory to measure brain connectivity, the 
exact nature of information is not important because Shannon‟s information 
equations are used as mathematical tools to identify the functional and 
effective connections between groups of neurons. However, the nature of 
information does become important when a property of the system called 
information integration is linked to consciousness. In this shift it is no longer 
the relationships between biological neurons that are important, but the 
presence of information integration in the system. It then becomes necessary 
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to say what information is and how it can be identified in an arbitrary 
system.  
To understand the problem of identifying information, imagine that an 
aubergine is lying on the table in front of you. Simply through its existence 
on the table, this aubergine contains the information that there is an 
aubergine on the table in front of you. Cut the aubergine open and a pattern 
of seeds is revealed, which can be interpreted as letters in a particular 
language. The genetic code of the aubergine can also be read and the 
aubergine contains an enormous amount of information about the location of 
each of its atoms relative to a particular reference point. Each of these types 
of information at different levels of the aubergine can be transformed into 
other types of information. For example, the sequence of nucleotides in the 
aubergine‟s DNA could be remapped into a sequence of numbers representing 
an image or sound.  
This example of the aubergine suggests that physical objects can be 
interpreted as containing a virtually infinite quantity of information, which is 
highly dependently on the approach that the observer takes to the system. 
One theory of information that can handle this apparent relativity is the 
General Definition of Information (GDI). According to Floridi‟s (2009) 
formulation of the GDI, σ is an instance of information, understood as 
semantic content, if and only if:  
 GDI.1) σ consists of n data, for n >= 1; 
 GDI.2) the data are well-formed; 
 GDI.3) the well formed data are meaningful. 
This GDI is based on the notion of data, which Floridi describes as a lack 
of uniformity in the world. The data that is accessible to us and can be read 
depends on pre-theoretical differences in the physical world, called dedomena, 
which cannot be experienced without an interpretation that is applied to the 
world. These dedomena are the conditions of possibility for experienced data - 
something like Kant‟s noumena or Locke‟s substance - that make the 
differences we can measure and manipulate possible. For example, dedomena 
might make the measureable difference between higher and lower charge in a 
battery possible, and this type of measureable difference between physical 
states can in turn be used to create higher levels of data, such as symbols. A 
definition of the scope and type of data that is available in a system is called a 
level of abstraction by Floridi. Within the brain, different levels of abstraction 
include the voltages of neurons‟ membranes, the average neuron group 
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activity and the location and state of the molecules, atoms and ions. 
Experimental issues connected with the selection of a level of abstraction are 
discussed in Section 4.3. 
From the point of view of information-based theories of consciousness, 
this distinction between dedomena and data that we understand and 
manipulate is important because only dedomena can be considered to be an 
objective property of the system. The data or sets of differences that we 
actually extract will always be the result of a particular level of abstraction 
that defines the scope and type of the available data. This is not a problem if 
we are only interested in correlations between information integration and 
consciousness, but it is a significant issue for Tononi‟s claim that information 
integration is consciousness because consciousness is typically thought to be 
an objective feature of the world, whereas the data that we extract from a 
system results from the choice of a particular level of an abstraction by an 
observer. One way of addressing this problem would be to use a level of 
abstraction that is well defined by science with precise measurement 
procedures, such as data at the level of fundamental particles. It would then 
be possible to interpret other measurements of the system, such as neuron 
firing activity, in the light of this underlying fundamental data. Another 
potential solution would be to interpret data measurements at different levels 
of abstraction as different levels of approximation to the underlying 
dedomena. However, a major problem would be encountered if there were 
radically different amounts of information integration at different levels of 
the system – for example, if information integration at the level of neurons 
was significantly different from information integration at the level of neuron 
groups – a problem that is discussed in Section 4.3.  
Once a method for identifying data in a system has been defined, the next 
stage is to specify a syntax that will enable well formed data to be extracted in 
a systematic way - for example, the sequences of nucleotides that constitute 
the aubergine‟s genetic code can only be read when we can distinguish 
between sequences coding proteins and junk DNA. Within the brain, Floridi‟s 
notion of syntax corresponds to the different experimental techniques that 
are used to extract data at different levels of abstraction. For example, 
neurons‟ firing can be read by inserting electrodes and recording the voltage 
within a certain frequency range, and the activity of large neuron groups can 
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be read using fMRI scanning: in each case the application of a tightly 
specified experimental syntax leads to well formed data, structured as voltage 
spikes or the levels of activation in fMRI voxels. 
Although it is relatively easy to extract well formed data at a particular 
level of abstraction from a system, this data might not be meaningful in any 
way. Suppose that an aubergine is cut in half, covered with a grid of 
millimetre squares and a 1 is read off if the square contains an even number of 
seeds and a 0 is read off if the square contains an odd number of seeds. This 
sequence of 1s and 0s is well formed data because it conforms to the specified 
syntax, but since it lacks meaning, it is not information according to the GDI. 
The question of what makes data meaningful is much more difficult than the 
identification of data in a system, and one of Floridi‟s (2009) suggestions is 
that semantic content could be described as a combination of data and 
queries. So, for example, the proposition “The earth only has one moon” can 
be interpreted as a piece of meaningful data in which the semantic content is 
the question “Does the Earth only have one moon?” and the answer “yes” is 
a single bit of data.  
Starting with the work of Shannon (1948), there has been an extensive 
amount of work on the communication of information, describing the entropy 
of an information source, the mutual information between two devices and 
the maximum rate of communication over a channel. However, as Floridi 
points out, Shannon‟s mathematical theory of communication (MTC) is a 
theory about data transmission, not information transmission, because it does 
not take the meaning of the messages into account: “since MTC is a theory of 
information without meaning (not in the sense of meaningless, but in the 
sense of not yet meaningful), and since we have seen that [information – 
meaning = data], „mathematical theory of data communication‟ is a far more 
appropriate description of this branch of probability theory than „information 
theory‟.” (Floridi 2009, p. 33). This suggests that “information integration” 
algorithms based on Shannon‟s work, such as Tononi and Sporns (2003), are 
actually measures of data integration, unless it can be shown that the 
integrated data carries semantic content.  
This distinction between data and information poses an interesting 
question about whether there could be a link between information integration 
and consciousness, where information is understood as meaningful data. 
Within the brain, this type of meaningful data could be states that co-vary 
with the world, such as neurons in the cat visual cortex that alter their firing 
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in response to bars of light moving in particular directions (Hubel and Wiesel 
1959), or neurons that respond to the written name or picture of a famous 
person (Quiroga et al. 2005). Externalist theories of consciousness, such as 
Clark (2008) or O‟Regan and Nöe (2001), might claim that there is a link 
between consciousness and information integration, understood as integration 
between brain states that co-vary with the world, whereas a purely brain-
based theory would claim that any kind of data integration within the brain 
would be correlated with or be conscious states.  
In the rest of this paper “data integration” will be used to refer to 
analyses of a system that do not take the meaning of the data at a particular 
level of abstraction into account, such as the algorithm proposed by Balduzzi 
and Tononi (2008), and “information integration” will be used to refer to 
analyses based on meaningful data. Quotation marks around “information 
integration” will be used to indicate the original use of the term. 
 
 
4. Testing the Link Between Data Integration and Consciousness 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Tononi‟s (2004; 2008) “information integration” theory of consciousness 
(more correctly described as a data integration theory of consciousness) is an 
empirical theory about a link between a measured feature of the physical 
world and phenomenal experience whose strength is that it makes strong 
claims about the world that can be shown to be false. Many other theories of 
consciousness, such as higher order thought (Rosenthal 1986), might be 
thought to be intuitively plausible, but they are not scientific if they cannot 
be experimentally tested.  
Experiments on the link between data integration and consciousness are 
likely to involve the following steps: 
1. Select a system that is known or commonly agreed to be conscious. 
2. Measure the data integration of the system. 
3. Measure the consciousness of the system. 
4. Identify correlations between data integration and consciousness. 
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5. Test predictions made by data integration about the consciousness of the 
system. 
These stages are covered in sections 4.2-4.6, and Section 4.7 looks at how 
the data integration approach could be developed into experiments on the 
relationship between information integration and consciousness. While this 
discussion is framed in terms of Tononi‟s theory, a similar methodology could 
be applied to any theory of consciousness that is expressed in a precise 
mathematical or algorithmic form.  
 
 
4.2. The Platinum Standard System 
 
To establish whether data integration in a physical system is linked to 
conscious states it is necessary to start with a physical system that is known 
or commonly agreed to be associated with consciousness. Although we 
typically assume that infants and higher mammals are conscious, the only 
system that is confidently associated with consciousness is the awake normal 
adult human brain. By „normal‟ it is meant that the brain is undamaged and 
its functions and measurements fall within two standard deviations for the 
human species. „Awake‟ is intended in a non-technical sense to indicate that 
the brain is functioning in a way that is typically considered „conscious‟. This 
type of wakefulness is distinct from the medical definition, since apparently 
wakeful states can be exhibited by people in a vegetative state who are 
unlikely to be conscious (Laureys et al. 2002). While there will be times when 
the awake normal adult human brain is not conscious – for example, epileptic 
automatism (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998) - a science of consciousness 
has to start somewhere, and the awake normal adult human brain is the 
physical system that we are most certain is typically associated with 
conscious states.  
The awake normal adult human brain will be referred to as the platinum 
standard system. Just as a platinum-iridium bar in Paris was used to define 
the length of a metre, the awake normal adult human brain is our platinum 
standard for a conscious system. If this physical system is not associated with 
conscious states most of the time, then nothing is. A further assumption, that 
the consciousness associated with different platinum standard systems is 
roughly the same, may become necessary for detailed predictions about the 
contents of consciousness. 
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It is important to note that artificial systems cannot be used to test the 
link between data integration and consciousness because it is not clear 
whether they are associated with conscious states. If a link between data 
integration and consciousness could be established, then it would become 
possible to make predictions about the consciousness of artificial systems 
using data integration, but this link has to be demonstrated on a platinum 
standard system first. 
 
 
4.3. Measuring Data Integration in the Platinum Standard System 
 
To investigate the link between data integration and consciousness it is 
necessary to measure the amount of data integration in the platinum 
standard system. As discussed in Section 3, only the dedomena, or pre-
theoretical differences in the physical world, can be considered to be 
objectively present in the system, whereas the data that we actually extract is 
always the result of a choice of a level of abstraction by an observer. Some of 
this subjectivity can be eliminated by grounding the levels of abstraction 
defined by neuroscience (neuron firing,2 activity of neuron groups) in the 
levels of abstraction defined by physics and chemistry (sub-atomic, atomic, 
molecular). However, this leaves the problem that it is far from clear whether 
the amount and distribution of data integration at different levels will 
coincide or significantly differ. As an example, consider the problem of 
measuring colour in a sack of oranges. If colour is measured at the level of 
individual oranges, then the sack of oranges will be pronounced orange. 
Likewise, an analysis at the level of segments will result in an orange colour, 
but analyses at the sub-atomic level or at the level of pips will result in zero 
orange colour. With data integration analyses, the key experimental 
challenge is to identify whether different levels coincide or contradict – for 
example, whether data integration analyses at the level of ions match 
analyses based on areas of the brain. If the data integration at different levels 
                                                 
2 At the level of neuron firing, there is also the question about whether the interpretation 
of the neural code affects the amount of data integration – for example, rate-based 
analyses could give very different results from analyses based on polychromous groups 
(Izhikevich 2006). 
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does not match, then a correlations-based interpretation of the link between 
data integration and consciousness could make it an empirical question about 
which level of analysis is the most strongly correlated with consciousness. A 
mismatch between levels would be more problematic for an identity claim 
between data integration and consciousness – it might be necessary to 
supplement Tononi‟s (2004; 2008) theory with the claim, for example, that 
only data integration at the level of neurons is consciousness, which would 
greatly reduce its generality. 
The presence of multiple data integration algorithms that apparently 
measure the same objective property of the physical world raises the question 
about which is the most accurate algorithm and how this accuracy can be 
measured. The accuracy of data integration algorithms could be evaluated by 
making the (problematic) assumption that data integration is correlated with 
consciousness, and carrying out experiments – for example, using fMRI or 
EEG – that measure the correlation between the output of the data 
integration algorithms and the reports of conscious states from the platinum 
standard system. If data integration is correlated with consciousness, then the 
algorithms that most accurately predict consciousness would be the most 
accurate measures of data integration. The main problem with this approach 
is that some or all of the algorithms might be measuring a property of the 
brain that is correlated with consciousness, but which has nothing to do with 
data integration. There is also the issue that our spatial and temporal access 
to the brain is severely limited, which makes it very difficult to measure data 
integration in humans.  
Another way of measuring the accuracy of data integration algorithms is 
to create simulated networks with regions that we expect to have high data 
integration – for example, a network with several highly intra-connected 
modules would be expected to have greater data integration within each 
module. Different data integration algorithms could be run on these networks 
and their output compared with the areas of expected maximum data 
integration. This approach has the problem that our intuitions about the 
areas of maximum data integration might not be correct, but there does not 
appear to be a way of measuring the data integration of a network that does 
not depend on a particular algorithm. While the simulated networks 
approach is problematic, until our access to the brain improves it appears to 
be the only method available for the comparison of different measures of data 
integration. A set of test networks for benchmarking the accuracy of different 
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“information integration” algorithms has been proposed by Gamez and 
Aleksander (2011). 
A second problem with measuring data integration is the performance of 
some of the current algorithms - for example, it has been predicted to take 
109000 years to fully analyze an 18,000 neuron network using Tononi and 
Sporns‟ algorithm (Gamez 2008) and it could take a billion years to analyze a 
network of 30 elements using Balduzzi and Tononi‟s algorithm (Gamez and 
Aleksander 2011). Some work on addressing this issue has been carried out by 
Gamez and Aleksander (2011), who developed an algorithm for measuring 
“information integration” that scales linearly with the number of neurons 
and connections. However, even with these improvements, current 
supercomputers are likely to struggle with a full analysis of the platinum 
standard system, which has around 1010 neurons and 1015 synapses. Although 
artificial systems cannot be used as platinum standard systems, they are an 
ideal test environment for benchmarking the performance and accuracy of 
different ways of measuring data integration. 
A further problem with some of the “information integration” 
algorithms, such as state-based Φ and liveliness, is that they rely on 
knowledge about the underlying causal structure of the system. This is not a 
problem with artificial systems, where the causal structure is usually known, 
but typical measurements of the platinum standard system, such as fMRI, 
EEG or electrode data, are sequences of states whose causal relationships are 
unknown. This is not an issue for Seth‟s Granger causality measure (Seth 
2008), and it could be partially addressed in the other measures by inferring 
the causal structure from the sequences of states using Granger causality, 
transfer entropy or mutual information.  
 
 
4.4. Measuring Consciousness in the Platinum Standard System 
 
In experiments on the link between data integration and consciousness, the 
data integration of the physical system is compared with measurements of 
conscious states. In the platinum standard system consciousness is typically 
measured through first person reports, although other behaviours can be used 
to infer the presence of consciousness and its contents. It is also possible to 
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use cognitive abilities that are systematically linked to consciousness to 
reliably infer the presence of consciousness in a platinum standard system 
(Shanahan 2010). There are numerous problems with the measurement of 
consciousness, such as the dependence on potentially fallible memory and the 
limited bandwidth and accuracy of human language – see Shanahan (2010) 
for a more detailed discussion. 
 
 
4.5. Correlations between Data Integration and Consciousness in the Platinum 
Standard System 
 
While falsifiable predictions are the gold standard for scientific theories (see 
Section 4.6), initial work on the link between data integration and 
consciousness is likely to focus on the identification of correlations between 
data integration and consciousness. Early experiments, such as the ones 
described in Section 2, are studying whether the presence of consciousness is 
correlated with higher data integration; eventually research will move on to 
examine whether different degrees of consciousness are linked to different 
amounts of data integration and whether the contents of consciousness vary 
in the way suggested by “information integration” theories.  
 
4.6. Predictions about Consciousness in the Platinum Standard System 
 
“...the real test of a scientific theory of consciousness is its ability to make 
falsifiable predictions: I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or 
scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These 
considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a 
system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation ... I shall require that its 
logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical 
tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical system to be 
refuted by experience.” Popper (2002), p.18.  
A substantial amount of the current work on consciousness is based on 
theories that are felt to be more or less intuitively plausible. To become truly 
scientific, the study of consciousness has to move towards a situation in which 
predictions made about the consciousness of a platinum standard system are 
compared with the platinum standard system‟s behavioural reports about its 
consciousness.  
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The “information integration” theory that is most capable of making 
predictions (Tononi 2008) can predict the areas of a physical system that are 
associated with consciousness, the amount of consciousness in these areas and 
the qualitative character of this consciousness. When we can measure the 
human brain at a higher spatial and temporal resolution (and if the 
performance of current algorithms can be improved), it should become 
possible to use data integration algorithms to make predictions about the 
consciousness of a platinum standard system and compare these predictions 
with first person reports. The “information integration” theory of 
consciousness would become widely accepted if it could make large numbers 
of accurate predictions about the contents of consciousness of human subjects 
using only physical information about the system. 
 
 
4.7. Information Integration and Consciousness 
 
A possible link between information integration (integration between 
meaningful data) and consciousness is supported by the observation that the 
brain contains a large amount of unconscious data processing - regulating the 
body, low level motor control, etc. - whereas conscious states are mostly or 
entirely about features of our bodies and world. When I look around me I see 
mountains topped with snow, feel wind on my face and experience hunger in 
my stomach, but I am completely unaware of brain states that are unrelated 
to states of my body and environment.3 This suggests that integration 
between meaningful data (or information, according to Floridi) might be 
more important for consciousness than data integration alone – a suggestion 
supported by the growing trend in recent years towards embodied theories of 
consciousness, which emphasize the links between brain, body and world 
(O‟Regan and Noe 2001; Clark 2008). To fit in with these phenomenological 
observations, data integration theories of consciousness must be able to show 
                                                 
3 One candidate for a non-representational phenomenal state was put forward by Block 
(1995), who claimed that the phenomenal content of orgasm is non-representational. This 
is not a particularly good example because the phenomenal content of orgasm can readily 
be interpreted as a representation of the internal states of a person‟s body, genitalia and 
emotion system. 
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that meaningful data in the brain has the highest integration, or find a 
different way of explaining why human phenomenal experience appears to be 
almost entirely about our body and world. 
Analyses for data integration start with a set of connected elements, 
interpret their states as data, and use an algorithm to identify the balance 
between differentiation and integration in this data. This approach could also 
be used to analyze a system for information integration if the meaningful 
data was identified first, and then the algorithm was run on the meaningful 
data to measure its differentiation and integration. This could be carried out 
in the brain by defining meaningful data as data that co-varies with the world, 
which would be classified as representational data by some interpretations of 
this term. 
Representational neurons can be identified in the brain by inserting 
electrodes and exposing the subject to different stimuli: if a neuron alters its 
firing in response to a stimulus, then it is said to be representing that 
stimulus. Classic work in this area was carried out by Hubel and Wiesel 
(1959), who inserted electrodes into the brains of cats and identified neurons 
that altered their activity in response to moving bars of light. More recently 
Quiroga et al. (2005) identified neurons in human subjects that varied their 
firing in response to the presence of a famous person, independently of 
whether the person was presented as a written word or picture. At the level of 
neuron groups, there has been a substantial amount of work on the 
identification of correlations between fMRI activity and representational 
content in subjects‟ minds. The general procedure is to measure the state of 
the brain using fMRI scanning, establish correlations between the fMRI 
patterns and features of the stimuli that the subjects are exposed to, and use 
the correlations to make predictions about novel stimuli. Recent work has 
shown that it is possible to identify patterns of fMRI activity that are linked 
to the images subjects are looking at (Kay et al. 2008), the words subjects are 
reading (Mitchell et al. 2008), and the tasks people are intending to perform 
(Haynes et al. 2007). As our ability to access the brain improves, it might also 
be possible to apply techniques that have been developed for identifying 
representational states in artificial systems to the brain, such as backtracking 
(Krichmar et al. 2005) or a combination of noise injection and mutual 
information (Gamez 2008).  
Analyses for information integration that apply data integration 
algorithms to representational states will face the same performance and 
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accuracy problems as the work on data integration and consciousness. In 
addition it is likely to be very difficult to exhaustively probe a system for its 
representational states, particularly for more abstract ones that cross 
multiple sensory modalities.  
 
 
4.8. The Path Ahead 
 
The problems identified in this paper currently make it impractical to 
systematically test data or information integration algorithms on the 
platinum standard system. Instead, initial work in this area is likely to use 
artificial neural networks, possibly embodied in robots, to develop more 
efficient algorithms and investigate novel ways of analyzing networks for 
data and information integration. This work on artificial systems will feed 
into experimental work using scanning data with low spatial and/or temporal 
resolution, such as the experiments discussed in Section 2. Eventually it is 
hoped that improvements in the speed of computers, increased spatial and 
temporal accuracy of brain scanning, and greater efficiency of data and 
information integration algorithms will make it possible to establish whether 
there are systematic correlations between data or information integration and 
consciousness in the platinum standard system.  
If empirical evidence could establish that data or information integration 
is systematically linked with consciousness in the platinum standard system, 
then data or information integration algorithms could be used to make 
believable predictions about the consciousness of other systems, such as 
artificial systems, infants and animals. However, it is also possible that 
empirical research will demonstrate that data and/or information integration 
are not correlated with consciousness in the platinum standard system, or that 
they fail to make accurate predictions about consciousness. In this case, data 
and/or information integration theories should be abandoned and better 
approaches sought.  
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This paper has outlined the “information integration” theory of consciousness 
and used Floridi‟s work to provide a systematic interpretation of information 
that can explain how consciousness could be linked to data or information 
integration in the physical system. According to Floridi‟s definition of 
information, Tononi‟s “information integration” theory of consciousness is 
much more accurately described as a data integration theory of consciousness, 
and there is a separate question about whether there is a connection between 
consciousness and information, understood as meaningful data.  
An overview has also been given of some of the experimental issues 
surrounding work on the possible link between data or information 
integration and consciousness. If a link between data or information 
integration and consciousness could be established, then it would become 
possible to use data or information integration algorithms to make believable 
predictions about the consciousness of humans, animals and artificial 
systems. Although “information integration” theories of consciousness are 
promising, this work is at an early stage of development, and much more 
experimental research is needed in this area. 
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